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COUPLES: MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNION,
AND DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP
DAVID

I

L.

CHAMBERS

N THIS COUNTRY, DURING THE LAST DECADES OF THE

twentieth century, thousands of lesbians married other women and
thousands of gay men married other men. Many of these couples recited traditional vows in churches and synagogues. Others have pledged to each other in
their own backyards in words that they wrote themselves. But not one of these
thousands of solemn occasions was recognized as creating a legally valid marriage. In the United States, each state has its own statute defining who can
marry, and as far as the states were concerned, these couples were playing dress
up. One state has now made an abrupt change. Just before this book went to
press, Vermont's legislature, prodded by a decision of the state Supreme Court,
enacted a statute that permits same-sex couples to enter into "civil unions" and
obtain all the legal benefits and burdens of marriage except the name. It is, however, too soon to know whether or when other states will create similar forms of
unions or whether Vermont will eventually take the final step and call civil
unions "marriage."
Thus, two quite different social histories might be written about this
same period. One is of the growth in the numbers of same-sex weddings and
commitment ceremonies performed in the United States, as well as the in-
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crease in the social acceptance for such unions by gay people, by their constructed and their biological families and by the media. That encouraging story
will not be told here. The story here is the history of the intermittent and
much less successful efforts to secure legal recognition of same-sex marriage
in the United States. This is a story in progress, one that may well have a happy
ending. It has some heroes-some courageous couples who have put themselves on the line, some talented advocates who always believe that victory is
near, and the justices of two state supreme courts who went out on a limb.
Overall, however, it is a story of repeated judicial and political defeats and of
tension among gay activists and between national and local groups.
A second and closely related story is also one in progress. It is the more
gratifying story of the movement to secure legal recognition of lesbian and gaymale couple relationships in ways other than marriage, the history of efforts to
obtain "domestic partnership." In Hawaii today, legal same-sex marriage has
been rejected, but the legislature now permits same-sex couples to register
their relationship and secure many of the benefits that married couples enjoy.
Hundreds of corporations, municipalities, and universities now provide health
and other benefits to the same-sex partners of their employees. Whatever the
final outcome of the story of the efforts to obtain legal recognition of same-sex
marriage, it will inevitably be intertwined with the story of domestic partnership. Indeed, Vermont created civil union as the legal equivalent of marriage,
but civil union can, of course, be seen as the ultimate form of domestic partnership.

THE
OF

MOVEMENT

FOR

LEGAL

RECOGNITION

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

The 1970s

The first efforts to secure state recognition of gay relationships in the
United States occurred in the early 1970s. The nascent national gay organizations of the time played no role whatever. To some involved in the early
national movement, marriage was just one more tool of the capitalist establishment, a corrupt institution through which men sustained dominance over
women and property. To the extent that gay activists addressed issues of public
policy in the first few years after Stonewall, they focused largely on reducing
harassment of gay people by the poHce. They hoped that harassment might be
reduced if the police and mainstream society could be led to view gay persons
as simply harmless and pitiable, rather than as immoral and mentally unstable.
By contrast, opening up the institution of civil marriage would have required a
much more radically restructured view of gay people-a view of us as morally
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worthy and of our loving relationships as comparable in merit to the most hallowed of relationships in heterosexual society. At the time, few gay people and
almost no heterosexual people held such a view.
Still, Stonewall had occurred, and in the largest gay enclaves, more and
more lesbians and gay men were living their lives in the open. Some gay couples were holding weddings. Ministers of the Metropolitan Community
Church, organized in 1968, had begun performing weddings for their members. 1 The August 1970 issue of The Advocate proclaimed that America was experiencing a "gay marriage boom." 2 It was thus inevitable that, despite general
public hostility to gay people, some lesbian and gay male couples would be
bold and determined enough to present themselves at a city clerk's office demanding a marriage license. And some did. Indeed, during the early 1970s,
across the country, close to a dozen couples did-and three couples followed
the state's refusal to issue a license by filing a lawsuit. The stories of these three
couples are instructive about the state of gay political efforts at the time.
The first case was brought in Minnesota. Jack Baker was a law student at
the University of Minnesota. Michael McConnell was a librarian. They had
begun dating in 196 7. By 1970, they were both involved in gay political activity. At Minnesota, Jack was a member of a gay student group called FREE
(Fight Repression of Erotic Expression). Imbued with the spirit of the civil
rights era, Jack believed in "equal rights, in all areas of society.... We've got to
integrate the gay community into the heterosexual community at large."3 He
was also familiar with the activist tactics of the antiwar protesters. Thus,
through FREE, Baker tried in various ways "to provoke a heterosexual backlash
by rhetorical and psychological confrontation," because backlash, he believed,
could lead to educational opportunities. 4 He found, however, that sending demands to state legislators, organizing gay dances on campus, and dancing with
his partner at the law school's Barristers' Ball produced little reaction. Openly
gay on campus, Jack ran for student association president, and won; Walter
Cronkite reported the event as a curiosity on his nightly newscast.
In the spring of 1970, Jack and Michael devised a new tactic. They decided to marry and invited the press to come with them when they applied for
a marriage license. With this move, they evoked the reaction they had been
hoping for. On May 18, they held a press conference and marched to the city
clerk's office with a crowd of reporters. The clerk refused to issue a license
without consulting with the county attorney. The event attracted television
and newspaper attention across the country. Jack and Michael were, so far as I
can find, the first same-sex couple in American history to seek a marriage
license openly. Shortly afterward, McConnell reflected that getting married by
the state would have been "a political act with political implications. I sincerely
believe that my love for Jack is as valid and deep as any heterosexual love, and
I think it should be recognized-I demand that it be recognized!-by the state
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and society." 5 Just as his war-protesting classmates believed they could bring
down the military establishment, Baker believed that "within five years we can
turn the whole institution of marriage upside down." 6
The story reached gay audiences through The Advocate, then in its
fourth year as "the newspaper of America's homophile community." Baker and
McConnell were the headline story for the mid-June 1970 issue 7 and probably
planted the idea of legal marriage in many gay persons' minds for the first time.
The couple reached a vastly wider audience in early 1971, when they were featured in a three-page spread in Look magazine, a widely read photo magazine
of general circulation, as part of an issue devoted to the American family. Jack
and Michael were "The Homosexual Couple," sandwiched between articles on
two other growing and culturally unsettling groups-"The Young Unmarrieds"
and "The Executive Mother." In a series of attractive pictures, Jack and
Michael are lathered up and shaving, snuggling on a couch while a straight
friend plays a guitar, chatting with their priest after a mass at the campus
Catholic chapel, and presenting themselves at the counter in the city clerk's office applying for the license. For its era, the article is breathtakingly positive.
Except for a few lapses when trying to distinguish the two from other gay men
("Neither is a limp-wristed sissy"), the text and photo captions have the same
sort of isn't-this-sweet, patronizing tone that we expect today in a story about a
gay couple in People or Newsweek.
When Baker and McConnell's request for a license was eventually refused, they turned to the courts, aided by a local attorney who was unaffiliated
with any gay or civil rights organization. The Minnesota trial court, like later
courts in other states, rejected both a statutory claim that the state marriage
statute permitted same-sex marriage and a constitutional claim that the U.S.
Constitution compelled its recognition. The couple appealed to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, this time with the help of the Minnesota Civil Liberties
Union. The court upheld the trial court's decision in a brief opinion, dismissing arguments under the due process and equal protection clauses. 8 The court
justified its decision on the ground that marriage uniquely involves procreation
and the rearing of children. It also explicitly rejected analogies between barriers to same-sex marriage and barriers to interracial marriage, which had by
then been held unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court. Baker's lawyer
had argued that prohibitions on women marrying women when men can marry
women were constitutionally indistinguishable from miscegenation statutes
that permit blacks to marry blacks but not to marry whites. Miscegenation
statutes involve race discrimination, said the court. Sex discrimination is different.
In September 1971, while the Baker case was still pending before the
Minnesota Supreme Court, Paul Barwick and John Singer applied for a mar-
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riage license in Seattle, Washington. Like Baker and McConnell, Barwick and
Singer were deeply involved in gay political activities in their local communities. 9 In other ways they were quite different. Jack Baker was in many ways the
prototype of the earnest student activist of his day. Barwick and Singer, in the
language of the time, were hippies. They lived in a commune with a half dozen
others involved in running a new gay community center. They were active in
antiwar efforts. Like Baker and McConnell, they recall having been frustrated
by the meager news coverage for gay issues in their area.
Their decision to seek a marriage license followed a speech at the gay
community center by a local state representative. The legislator boasted that
he had recently succeeded in securing legislative language that changed the
marriage statute into sex-neutral terms. He implicitly challenged the group to
test the reach of the statute. Others at the center were enthusiastic, and Barwick and Singer volunteered because they thought they were in the least vulnerable positions in their jobs. Barwick was working as director of the gay
center. Singer worked for the federal Equal Employment Opportunities Commission. Quite unlike Baker and McConnell, who regarded themselves in a
marriage-like relationship, Barwick and Singer were simply good friends and
housemates who had had sex with each other from time to time. "We were not
an item," recalls Singer today. They liked the idea of seeking a marriage license
because they anticipated that it would generate public discussion about gay
people·and gay relationships.
Like Baker and McConnell, they invited the press, presented themselves
at a clerk's office, and were rejected. Only then did they face squarely the question whether to file a lawsuit. Some within the local gay community strongly
supported the idea of marriage, but feared going to court because they regarded it as seeking too much, too soon. Some feminist and lesbian friends
were hostile to seeking marriage rights at all, but were assuaged by Singer's explanation that one of his goals was to challenge mainstream definitions of marriage and the family. Barwick and Singer assumed from the outset that the
courts would reject their claims. Indeed, Barwick says he would have been
stunned if they had decided otherwise. If the state had permitted them to
marry, Barwick reflects, he and John would have been both America's first officially married gay couple and America's first officially divorced gay couple.
They did decide to file a case and approached the local chapter of the
ACLU. The chapter considered their request, but, as Singer recalls, thrashed
the matter out in many committees with endless "rigmarole" and eventually decided that litigation would be hopeless. A lawyer from the National Lawyers
Guild agreed to help them and filed suit on their behalf. In court, he made essentially the same arguments that had by then been rejected by the Minnesota
Supreme Court, and in the end the trial court and Washington Court of Ap-
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peals rejected their claims. 10 Unlike Minnesota's, Washington's constitution
contained a provision that guaranteed equality of rights based on sex, but
the court again rejected the analogy to the U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating miscegenation statutes. No sex discrimination was involved, declared
the court, because marriage is inherently the union of one man and one
woman. In their view, it was as preposterous for a man to argue that he had a
right to marry a man as it would be for a man to argue that he had a right to get
pregnant.
Despite the loss in the courts, Singer and Barwick regarded their efforts
as entirely successful. They generated just the publicity they hoped for. Like
Baker and McConnell, they induced an entourage of reporters to accompany
them to the clerk's office for a marriage license. Their request for a license was
reported across the country on 1V and carried on the AP and the UPI. Barwick
remembers that little news articles appeared as "fillers" across the country.
Like Baker and McConnell, they recalled being asked which one was the wife
and were pleased to be able to say that they were simply two men who were a
couple. Singer, who later changed his name to Faygele Ben Miriam, looked
back with particular pleasure at their success in reaching closeted gay people,
who had few positive images of gay men or gay relationships available to them.
He recalled receiving grateful letters from gay men in small cities across the
country. He and Barwick also spoke to gay and straight audiences all over
the state of Washington and distributed hundreds of copies of their lawyers'
brief.
The Minnesota and Washington couples nonetheless paid a heavy price
for putting themselves so squarely in the public eye. One member of each couple lost his job. Singer lost his position at the EEOC. He had been hired by the
regional office in part because he was gay, but was fired because the U.S. Civil
Service Commission still had rules prohibiting federal employment for homosexuals. McConnell lost a promised job as a librarian at the University of Minnesota. Both sued to get their jobs back and both lost. 11 In each case, a federal
court of appeals relied on their having "flaunted" their homosexuality publicly
in a manner that an employer need not tolerate. In rejecting McConnell's
claim that his seeking a marriage license was constitutionally protected behavior, the appellate court scoffed, "This is not a case involving mere homosexual
propensities on the part of a prospective employee .... It is, instead, a case in
which ... the prospective employee demands ... the right to pursue an activist role in implementing his unconventional ideas concerning the societal
status to be accorded homosexuals and, thereby, to foist tacit approval of this
societally repugnant concept upon his employer."
Looking back after a quarter century, the two couples share a similar
pride in their efforts and a similar resentment toward others who should have
been their allies. 12 Singer and Barwick remained bitter that the ACLU refused
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to help them in the marriage case. Baker remained bitter that the "so-called gay
leaders" in Minnesota at the time of the case were hiding deeply in their closets. Few spoke up on his and Michael's behalf when they were denied a license. Few spoke up for Michael when he was denied his promised job as a
librarian at the university. 13 Today, Jack and Michael have totally withdrawn
from political activism. They guard their privacy as assiduously as they once
promoted their outness.
The one other couple from this period to appeal the denial of a marriage
license was very different. The couples in Minnesota and Washington had
sought a marriage license to gain public attention for gay issues in general. The
third couple, Tracy Knight and Margery Jones, were uninvolved in gay politics
and were persuaded to file for marriage in 1970 by a lawyer who wanted public attention for himself. Knight and Jones lived in Louisville. I cannot locate
them today, but their attorney, Stuart Lyon, remains a general practitioner in
Louisville. According to Lyon, Knight and Jones had consulted him about a legal problem unrelated to their status as a couple. 14 According to Lyon, the two
women were "Damon Runyan-type characters" who ran a "flogging operation"
for straight masochists. So far as he knew, they had never been involved in gay
rights issues.
Lyon, looking back with some embarrassment, says that he was on an
"ego trip" at the time. He is not gay and had never previously worked on any issue regarding sexual orientation. He was simply an ambitious young lawyer
wanting to bring a high-profile case. He knew that the Kentucky marriage
statute directed that licenses be issued to "two adults," not just to "one man
and one woman," and he had heard about the Baker case pending in Minnesota. So, as he describes it, he talked the two women into applying for a license and, when the license was rejected, persuaded them to let him take the
matter to court. The trial and appellate court smirked at his claims. The appellate court, in a brief opinion, held that despite the sex-neutral terms of the
Kentucky act, marriage had always been considered the union of a man and a
woman and that was that. 15 In three abrupt sentences, it dismissed a hundred
pages of constitutional arguments that Lyon advanced in his brief.
As Lyon recalls, the case received some but not much coverage in the local and national news. No civil liberties or gay rights organization came to his
aid. After the loss in the court of appeals, he thought about taking the case to
the state supreme court, but by that time, the two women had broken up. Lyon
had also realized by then that an appeal would be futile.
A few others in the same era sought to marry. In Wisconsin, a lesbian
couple applied for a license, but did not turn to the courts when the license
was denied. A friendly city clerk in Boulder, Colorado, issued marriage licenses
to at least six same-sex couples, stopping only when ordered by the state attorney general. All the couples lost in later efforts to have their marriages recog-
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nized. 16 Thus, by the mid- l 970s, several same-sex couples had tried to force a
state to recognize them as married but none had succeeded. The law everywhere was just what it had been before. Worse, legal precedents had been set
that are still cited a quarter century later. The only positive consequences of
the early efforts were the news accounts depicting gay people in a positive
manner and informing many heterosexual and gay people for the first time that
some gay people were demanding that their relationships be recognized.

The l 980s

Between the mid- l 970s and 1987, no further gay male or lesbian couples
in the United States appear to have requested a marriage license or filed a case
demanding a right to one. The first gay legal organizations organized in the
1970s, and none placed gay marriage on their initial agendas. As William Eskridge has commented, the more "radical" activists within the gay communities
continued to reject marriage, and many others gave same-sex marriage a low
priority because other political issues seemed more pressing and because none
of the litigation from the 1970s had produced even minimally promising results.17 The early 1980s also marked the beginning of what many came to regard as an alternative strategy for the recognition of gay couples and
nontraditional family relationships-the move toward domestic partnership, a
movement that is discussed at greater length at the end of this chapter.
In 1986, when Nan Hunter started the ACLU's Lesbian and Gay Rights
Project, no marriage cases of any sort were pending or proposed, and nothing
existed resembling a "marriage strategy." 18 Indeed, Bawers v. Hardwick had just
been decided, and its dismissive tone convinced many that little possibility existed for obtaining federal constitutional protection for gay people in any aspect of their sexual or loving relationships. 19 By the end of the decade,
however, same-sex marriage had reappeared as a lively political issue among
gay people. Lesbians and gay men were celebrating ceremonies of commitment in large numbers. The Metropolitan Community Church had grown
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and its ministers conducted hundreds of
marriages every year. In 1987, at the second March on Washington, over one
thousand lesbian and gay male couples joined in marriage at the National
Cathedral with an accompanying rally at which some speakers demanded legal
recognition for gay unions. Large numbers of gay people, unaware of the earlier cases or undeterred by them, were becoming insistent about state recognition of their relationships. The push for recognition was intensified by the
tragic case of Sharon Kowalski, who had suffered brain damage in an automobile accident and whose biological family successfully blocked for many years
the efforts of her lover, Karen Thompson, to become her caretaker. Had they
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been married, Thompson would have been recognized as the appropriate
guardian as a matter of course.
Thus, by the late 1980s, for the first time, the issue of legal marriage asserted itself in the discussions of gay rights lawyers. The Legal Roundtable, a
group of gay rights litigators, first convened by Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in the mid- l 980s to plan strategy for challenges to sodomy laws,
evolved by the end of the 1980s into a general forum for discussing litigation
strategy on all gay issues. These discussions came to include debates on samesex marriage. By all accounts, no other issue produced discussions that were as
heated or acrimonious. Evan Wolfson of Lambda, who joined the organization's
staff in 1989 and has devoted much of his professional career to the gay
marriage issue, argued for filing gay marriage cases now in states most likely to
be sympathetic. To a lesser degree, Tom Stoddard, director of Lambda, agreed
with Wolfson. They both believed that the issue meant more to more gay
people than almost any other. On the other side, Paula Ettelbrick, then the legal director at Lambda, believed that, although gay people should be as entitled to marry as heterosexuals, marriage was a demeaning institution for both
groups and should be accorded a low priority. Views similar to Ettelbrick's were
held by Nancy Polikoff and many other lesbian feminists. 20
In 1989, Stoddard and Ettelbrick published a celebrated pair of articles
in the magazine Out/Look. 21 Ettelbrick argued that marriage undercuts much
of what lesbians and feminists have been fighting for ("I do not want to be
known as 'Mrs. Attached-to-Somebody-Else'") and that seeking marriage requires arguing that gay relationships are just like straight relationships, when
they are not. Stoddard, though acknowledging the stultifying inadequacies of
"traditional" marriage, argued that lesbian and gay male couples need marriage's legal protections and that gay relationships will be regarded as less valuable than heterosexual relationships until lesbian and gay male couples secure
the right to marry.
Taking a middle ground in the Roundtable deliberations were Nan
Hunter and Matt Coles of the ACLU and some others. They disagreed with
Ettelbrick's view of marriage as an irretrievably sexist institution, but agreed
with her conclusion that seeking marriage should be accorded a low priority.
On pragmatic grounds, they believed that, especially after Bowers, marriage
cases were certain to lose and would simply lead to a longer string of ruinous
precedents. As recently as 1988, for example, a state judge in Indiana had indicated his views of the frivolousness of the issue when denying two gay prison
inmates a license to marry. He fined them $2,800 and declared that their
"claims about Indiana law and constitutional rights are wacky and sanctionably
so."22 Ettelbrick, Coles, Hunter, and others also believed that pursuing domestic partnership advanced important goals for all .gay people and was more
promising as a strategy for securing benefits for same-sex couples.
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The l 990s

By the early 1990s, the Roundtable forums, whatever their staff members' individual views, had coalesced around a position that they themselves
would not bring cases seeking marriage rights and that they would actively
seek to discourage others from filing such cases. The middle view that such
cases were doomed to fail had carried the day. When an attorney in Hawaii
hoping to file a marriage case requested support from the National ACLU
Lesbian and Gay Rights Project and from Lambda, both groups declined. Over
the next few years, the same groups also declined to represent gay male
couples who wished to marry in New York, the District of Columbia, and
Alaska.
But the couples in Hawaii, New York, the District of Columbia, and Alaska
applied for marriage licenses anyway and, when licenses were refused, found
other attorneys willing to represent them in court. Years later, the couples in New
York, the District of Columbia, and Alaska, remained extremely resentful that the
national groups declined to help them. So did some of those in Hawaii who first
encouraged a suit. The Hawaii case, filed in 1990 and known initially as Baehr v.
Levin, led to a decision by the Hawaii Supreme Court that, though preliminary
in its holding, reshaped the gay marriage debate in the United States. It made
heterosexual people aware of the issue for the first time. It kindled hope and unrealistic expectations in thousands of gay couples. It produced political responses
in almost every state of the country. And it forced the Roundtable, caught by surprise, to develop an entirely new set of strategies. A few years later, in the last
weeks of the century, the Vermont Supreme Court issued a decision that reached
even further. The rest of the marriage section of this chapter deals with the
Hawaii and Vermont cases and the reactions to them.
The Baehr of Baehr v. Levin is Ninia Baehr. 23 When in her early thirties,
Ninia fell in love with Genora Dancel, Genora asked Ninia to marry her. Ninia
agreed. They were then taken aback when their life insurance companies refused to permit them to name each other as beneficiaries. They consulted with
Bill Woods, a lawyer and gay organizer in Hawaii. Woods had long advocated
litigation to secure same-sex marriage in the state. He gave them advice about
the insurance and asked them if they would like to challenge the Hawaii marriage law. Although they were not activists at that point, they nonetheless said
yes. Eventually two other couples joined with them. Woods claims credit today
as the "Creator of the Hawaii Gay Marriage Lawsuit."24 It was he who was rebuffed by the ACLU and Lambda when he initially sought their assistance.
Baehr and Dancel and the two other couples, Tammy Rodrigues and Antoinette Pregil, and Pat Lagon and Joseph Melilio, applied for licenses at the
Hawaii Department of Health in December 1990. Woods had invited the media, who appeared in substantial numbers. The staff of the Department of
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Health said that they would have to consult with the attorney general. Woods
then invited the press to follow him and the three couples from the Department of Health to the ACLU-Hawaii office. Woods, still furious at the national
ACLU's refusal to represent the couples, staged there a public and embarrassing request for the ACLU to represent the six license seekers. At a later point,
the ACLU-Hawaii again said no. Dan Foley, a heterosexual private practitioner
who had been the previous director of the ACLU-Hawaii, agreed to represent
the six license seekers. He has been their principal attorney ever since. In April
1991, when the state formally denied the couples' request, Foley promptly filed
a suit on their behalf in court.
The early stages of the litigation resembled the cases previously filed in
other states. The trial court dismissed each of the constitutional claims, and
the plaintiffs appealed to the state Supreme Court. In his brief, Foley stressed
the right to marry and discrimination based on sexual orientation and barely
mentioned a claim based on discrimination on the basis of sex. At this point,
most lawyers who knew anything about the case believed that, as in all the earlier cases, the state's appellate court would affirm. But, to almost everyone's
amazement, the court did not.
In May 1993, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court. Justice
Stephen Levinson, writing for a plurality of two judges, began inauspiciously
by rejecting the plaintiff's claim that gay people have a constitutionally protected interest in marrying someone of their sex, but then went on to hold that
the Hawaii statute presumptively denied the plaintiffs the equal protection of
the laws under the Hawaii constitution because it discriminates on the basis of
sex. 25 The Hawaii constitution includes a specific provision prohibiting discrimination based on sex, and to the surprise of many, Justice Levinson accepted the reasoning based on the anti-miscegenation cases that had been
rejected in the same-sex marriage cases from the seventies: he held that since
the Hawaii statute permitted men to marry women but prohibited women
from marrying women, the statute constituted unconstitutional discrimination based on sex, unless the state could demonstrate a compelling reason
for limiting marriage to persons of the opposite sex. The court remanded the
case to the trial court for a hearing at which the state would be permitted to
demonstrate a compelling interest. Gay groups in Hawaii and on the mainland
were ecstatic about the case's holding. For the first time in American history, a
court had suggested that same-sex couples were as entitled to marry as everyone else.
Within Hawaii, the political reverberations from the decision began immediately. Just as gay organizations were much more organized by the 1990s
than they had been when the first marriage cases were brought in the 1970s,
so too, of course, conservative political and legal organizations were much
more organized than they had been twenty years before. These conservative
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groups had discovered that speaking out against gay rights issues was an effective organizing tool. Between 1993 and 1997, every session of the Hawaii legislature produced new responses to the prospect of gay marriage. Hawaii
newspapers ran hundreds of articles. For years, Honolulu's largest paper
printed articles or letters almost every week. Television news covered every aspect of the story.
The Hawaii legislature reacted quickly after the Supreme Court decision. Within months, the legislature passed a statute that restated with clarity
that marriage was the union of one man and one woman. An accompanying
report castigated the justices for usurping the legislature's prerogative to determine important matters of family policy. In the same statute, the legislature established the Commission on Sexual Orientation and the Law to make
recommendations regarding the rights and benefits that same-sex couples
should have. The statute directed that the commission, when appointed, include, among others, members representing the Mormon and the Roman
Catholic Churches. The next year, after the provision regarding church representation was held unconstitutional by the state courts, the legislature created
another, smaller commission with much the same mission. The commission issued a report in December 1995 that, contrary to the expectations of the legislature, recommended, by a split vote, that the legislature legalize same-sex
marriage or, in the alternative, adopt a domestic partnership law that accords
same-sex couples most of the rights of married couples.
Not until the fall of 1996, more than three years after the Hawaii
Supreme Court's decision, did the trial court hold the hearing on remand in
Baehr at which the state was given the opportunity to demonstrate a compelling interest in limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. The delay of three
years before the trial court rehearing flowed largely from requests for extensions of time from the state's attorney general, who was hoping for a political
resolution of the controversy. At the hearing, the state made many arguments
for limiting marriage to persons of the opposite sex but seriously advanced only
one of them: that if gay people were permitted to marry, it would lead to their
greater participation in child rearing, and the state has strong reasons for preferring that children be raised by couples composed of one adult of each sex.
Each side put on several expert witnesses, but even the witnesses of the state
acknowledged that most gay men and lesbians raising children performed in a
fully satisfactory manner.
In December 1996, the trial judge, Judge Chang, ruled that the state had
failed to demonstrate the necessity of limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples
in order to assure that children were satisfactorily nurtured. 26 The decision
paints an overwhelmingly positive, albeit traditional, picture of lesbians and
gay men as parents and as partners. Judge Chang found that "children of gay
and lesbian parents and same-sex couples tend to adjust and develop in a nor-
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mal fashion" and that "in Hawaii, and elsewhere, same sex couples can, and do,
have successful, loving, and committed relationships." Opponents of gay marriage on the right criticized the state for failing to rely, except in passing, on
other arguments the right considered stronger, such as that permitting gay marriage would contribute to the destabilization of traditional heterosexual marriage and the collapse of traditional families.
Responding in 1997 to the trial court's decision on remand, the legislature approved a constitutional amendment to be submitted to the voters at the
elections in November 1998 that would give the legislature the power to limit
marriage to persons of the opposite sex. In the same session, it also enacted a
law called the Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act. This act provides to partners in
same-sex couples who register several of the rights of married couples, such as
intestate succession for a surviving partner, joint tenancy, and some employerprovided health benefits. 27 The act was the first law adopted by a state legislature permitting same-sex couples to register and obtain benefits accorded to
married couples.
The waves caused by the Hawaii decision soon traveled from the islands
to the mainland. By late 1993, marriage had replaced the military ban as the
gay political issue most in the national news. Among national groups, Lambda
played the central role. Almost immediately after the Hawaii Supreme Court
decision, Lambda changed course and agreed to provide its fullest support to
the plaintiffs in the remaining stages of the Baehr litigation. Evan Wolfson of
the Lambda staff, who had provided informal advice to the plaintiffs' lawyer,
Dan Foley, up to this point, joined Foley as cocounsel and worked with him at
every later stage. In addition, Wolfson and Lambda took the lead in forming the
National Freedom to Marry Coalition, which included virtually all national gay
organizations and still meets regularly to discuss strategy.
A first impact of Baehr on the rest of the country was to inspire couples in
other states to consider bringing litigation in their own courts. At first, the
Roundtable and the Coalition tried to discourage such cases, urging that couples wait for a final resolution in Hawaii before deciding whether to litigate.
Matthew Coles of the ACLU and Evan Wolfson each recall persuading local
groups to postpone filing cases. One group, for example, was from North Carolina, where no hope existed whatever for a positive judicial decision. The
Roundtable lawyers were, however, unable to discourage couples in Alaska and
New York. The couples there found lawyers who were wiHing to bring cases
without the blessing or participation of national organizations. After this new
pair of cases had been filed, the Roundtable group concluded that it should shift
its stand and take a proactive role in encouraging and working with local lawyers
to bring a case or two in states that might conceivably have receptive courts.
Out of these consultations came the Vermont litigation discussed below.
These few efforts at positive litigation to capitalize on Baehr have been
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dwarfed by the efforts required to respond to the legislative attacks on Baehr in
almost every state. Both the Marriage Coalition and the far right realized that
if Baehr was affirmed in the second appeal, an issue that would immediately
arise would be the recognition by other states of a same-sex marriage conducted in Hawaii. Lambda conscripted lawyers in almost every state to research whether a same-sex marriage conducted in Hawaii would be recognized
as valid in their state. It wanted to be ready to defend couples married in
Hawaii who returned to (or moved to) other states. It also wanted to be ready
to take the initiative to bring cases in states where the courts were especially
likely to be supportive.
Right-wing groups, on the other hand, devised strategies that could be
implemented before a final judicial resolution of Baehr. They provided conservative legislators in every state with draft legislation that would direct their
state's courts and other agencies to refuse to recognize a marriage between two
persons of the same sex conducted in another state. Promoting this legislation
proved to be an extremely successful move by conservative groups, for the legislation not only served as a rallying point for conservatives, but also divided
liberal legislators from their gay constituents. Many Democratic state legislators across the country either themselves believed that marriage should be limited to one man and one woman, or at least believed that they could not vote
against the far right's bill because of the views of most of their heterosexual
constituents. So, just as the far right had hoped, many otherwise liberal legislators voted for the bills and infuriated gay and lesbian voters. Gay groups, local and national, were forced to devote huge amounts of effort in nearly every
state to persuade legislators to reject the bills. In some states, they succeeded
in keeping bills bottled up in committee, but by late-1999, thirty states had
adopted nonrecognition legislation that may be impossible to overturn in the
courts and difficult to repeal in the legislatures, and bills or referenda were
pending in eight others, including California and New York. 28
Conservative members of Congress introduced comparable federal legislation with much the same effect. The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was
proposed by Republicans and adopted by Congress in the summer of 1996, in
the midst of congressional and presidential campaigning. 29 Since, under our
Constitution, it is the states, not the federal government, that define who is eligible to marry, Congress did not try to impose a uniform national law limiting
marriage to those of opposite sexes. But, in its only two substantive sections,
DOMA seeks to limit the effects of any state's judicial decision or legislation
that defines marriage in any other way. The first section asserts Congress's authority to enforce the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution and declares that states need not recognize the marriage of two people of the same sex
even if validly contracted in another state. Many legal scholars believe that this
section is unconstitutional. 30 The second section, one that may well prove
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more harmful in the long term, provides that all federal legislation and regulations that mention married persons or spouses shall be read as applying only to
persons in opposite-sex marriages. Again, usually liberal-voting legislators supported the bill and angered their gay constituents. President Clinton announced early in the deliberations that he himself believed that marriage
should be limited to opposite-sex unions and that he would sign the bill, making it that much easier for Democratic members of Congress to support the bill
and further alienating himself from gay supporters.
In ugly hearings leading up to the enactment, members of Congress and
witnesses forecast that if men could marry men, they would soon be permitted
to marry children and other animals. Several witnesses and senators feared the
collapse of Western civilization. Senator Jesse Helms believed that the samesex marriage movement threatened "the moral and spiritual survival of this
nation." 31 Representative Steve Largent warned that "the crosshairs of the homosexual agenda" were aimed at the institution of marriage. 32 National gay political organizations resisted, but not very much. They regarded themselves in
a bind. The Human Rights Campaign, for example, spoke out against the bill and
devoted some staff support to defeating it, but refused to work against the reelection of the president or of those members of Congress who, though voting
for DOMA, supported other legislation HRC wanted (notably ENDA, the employment non-discrimination bill). In the end, DOMA passed by wide margins
in each chamber. The president signed the bill but sought to soothe his gay and
liberal supporters by omitting the usual Rose Garden signing ceremony. A few
weeks later, in one of the televised presidential campaign debates, Clinton's opponent, Robert Dole, tried to demonstrate that he was even more opposed to gay
marriage than Clinton by ridiculing Clinton for signing the bill so secretively. 33
Our nation is a federal republic. Usually states recognize without quibble
the laws of other states. In all of American history there have been few occasions when states (or the Congress) have reacted with as much hostility to the
decisions or laws of another state as occurred in response to Baehr. In the years
before the Civil War, somewhat similar hostility was directed at the decisions of
judges in New England who refused to return fugitive slaves to their Southern
owners. And in the middle of this century, many states sought ways to refuse to
recognize divorces granted under Nevada's lax laws. That same-sex marriage has
stirred so much resistance demonstrates how widespread within America is the
attachment to a narrow vision of marriage and how widespread is the reluctance
to accept gay people within the social mainstream. The scale of the expressed
resistance is also a testament to the religious right's political acumen.
In November 1998, Hawaii's voters by a 70-30 landslide vote overwhelmingly adopted the constitutional amendment proposed by the legislature. The amendment permits the legislature to fix the definition of marriage as
limited to opposite-sex couples. A year later, the Hawaii Supreme Court dis-
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missed the Baehr case on the ground that the existing legislation limited marriage to one man and one woman.

THE VERMONT CASE:

BAKER

V.

STATE

When the Baehr odyssey came to an end in Hawaii, all but one of the
marriage cases that had been pending in other states had been resolved
unhappily. The District of Columbia plaintiffs, whom William Eskridge served
as lead counsel, lost in both the trial and appellate courts, though they did secure a gratifying dissent in the court of appeals. The New York case was dismissed. The Alaska case produced a fine victory in the trial court, with a
holding that the statute limiting marriage to one person of each sex violates gay
persons' fundamental right to marry, but Alaska's legislature responded by
proposing a constitutional amendment to limit marriage to one man and one
woman and Alaska's voters adopted the amendment in 1998 by about the same
margin as the voters in Hawaii. Only in Vermont did litigation lead to at least a
partial victory. The Vermont case, Baker v. State, is nonetheless a landmark decision, the first by a state appellate court squarely holding a marriage statute
unconstitutional. 34
In the Vermont litigation, unlike the marriage litigation in other states,
national legal organizations and local attorneys collaborated from the outset.
Susan Murray and Beth Robinson, law partners in a firm in Middlebury, Vermont, worked with Mary Bonauto of Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders in Boston. They found three Vermont couples, Peter Harrigan and Stan
Baker, Holly Puterbaugh and Lois Farnham, and Stacy Jolles and Nina Beck,
who were eager to marry. In 1996, the three couples applied for a marriage license in the usual manner, and when it was denied in the usual way, Bonauto,
Murray, and Robinson filed a lawsuit on their behalf.
The plaintiffs claimed that the Vermont marriage statute violated the
Vermont state constitution and, to prevent eventual review by the United
States Supreme Court, made no allegations under the U.S. Constitution. They
relied on a two-hundred-year-old Vermont provision that declares that "government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particular
emolument of any single man, family or set of persons who are a part only of
the community." This clause was originally intended to prohibit the giving of
privileges to a landed aristocracy, but had been interpreted by the Vermont
Supreme Court as a general protection against unjust discriminations of all
sorts in much the same manner that the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted
the Equal Protection clause.
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The state of Vermont found itself in an awkward position in defending
the marriage statute. The Attorney General, a liberal, was unwilling to argue
that same-sex couples should be excluded from marriage simply because Vermonters considered their relationships immoral, but had difficulty coming up
with other plausible explanations for the law. The state came up with seven
possible justifications. In its ruling in December 1997, the trial court rejected
six of them, but held that the statute was justified on the ground that sanctioning same-sex marriage would diminish the perception of the link between
marriage and procreation and thus reduce men's and women's sense of responsibility for childrearing.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court. In November
1998, Beth Robinson argued the case for the plaintiffs to a sympathetic court.
She began by drawing an analogy to a case from the I 950s in which the California Supreme Court became the first appellate court to strike down a statutory ban on interracial marriage. She said that, in the California case, the state
had made the same sorts of unfounded claims about harms to children and
families that Vermont was making here, and she bravely acknowledged that a
positive decision by the Vermont justices would require much the same
courage that had been shown by the California justices a half century before,
at a time when interracial marriage was regarded by the public even more hostilely than same-sex marriage is regarded today. The justices seemed to hear
her message. When counsel for the state began her presentation by claiming
that the California case was quite different (because some states had never
prohibited interracial marriages while all states prohibit marriage between persons of the same sex), one of the justices interrupted her and asked rhetorically, as to same-sex marriage, "Some state court has to go first, doesn't it?"
And, as the state's lawyer groped for a response, another justice asked her
whether the uniformity among the states regarding same-sex marriage might
not simply demonstrate the depth of the hostile feelings toward gay people in
our country. It was not a good day for the state's attorney.
Thirteen months later, in December 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court
issued its decision, unanimously holding unconstitutional the state's exclusion
of same-sex couples from marriage. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Jeffrey Amestoy, rejected all the justifications offered by the state. It found
no empirical support or logical plausibility for the claim that only by limiting
marriage to one man and one woman could the state sustain in the public mind
the link between procreation and parental responsibility. It supported its conclusions for equal treatment by pointing out that the state legislature itself had
recently prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and had permitted adoption by same-sex couples. In a stirring conclusion,
the court declared that "The extension of the Common Benefits Clause to ac-
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knowledge plaintiffs as Vermonters who seek nothing more, nothing less, than
legal protection and security for their avowed commitment to an intimate and
lasting human relationship is simply, when all is said and done, a recognition of
our common humanity."
Despite this embracing statement, the court did not then enter an order
directing the state to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Instead, in a
most unusual disposition, the court held that the state must extend all the legal benefits and responsibilities of married persons to same-sex couples, but
that it could do so either by permitting gay people to "marry" or by creating a
parallel institution known as domestic partnership or something else. It remitted the case to the legislature, telling the plaintiffs that if the legislature did not
provide full benefits within "a reasonable period of time," the court would order specific relief. One justice, Denise Johnson, dissented as to the remedy, asserting that the Court should have provided the relief that the plaintiffs had
demanded.
The Vermont legislature reconvened in early January 2000 and immediately began considering how to respond. The House and Senate Judiciary
Committees held joint public hearings in the House chamber attended by
thousands of people. More than two hundred Vermont citizens, chosen by lot,
spoke for and against marriage for two minutes each. Gay people told stories of
their own lives. The children of gay couples spoke. So did many others who
simply prized Vermonters' tolerance of diversity. Conservatives also testified in
large numbers, quoting Leviticus, railing against "Adam and Steve," forecasting
the collapse of the American family, and threatening revenge in November.
To the legislators' chagrin, almost no one had anything kind to say about
domestic partnership. One side sought marriage; the other urged the legislature to ignore the court and to begin the process of amending the state constitution. Conservative legislators strongly resisted creating an expansive form of
domestic partnership, saying it would really be marriage in thin disguise. "If it
looks like a duck and walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it is a duck and
we should reject it," fumed one Republican legislator from northern Vermont.
Of course, the gay organizations would have been glad to call the duck a duck,
but came to understand that their supporters in the legislature simply couldn't
put together enough votes to do so.
In the end, after receiving signals from gay organizations that they would
prefer marriage by another name to nothing at all, the House committee created an entity called "civil unions" available solely to same-sex couples and
poured into it every benefit and responsibility attaching to marriage. As with
the marriage statute, the civil union bill required not only that the couple register with the state but also that they enter into the relationship in the presence
of a minister or a justice of the peace. The bill carried each chamber by a narrow margin and was signed into law by Governor Howard Dean on Thursday,
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April 27, 2000. The law went into effect on July 1, 2000, and along with many
other couples across the state, Lois Farnham and Holly Puterbaugh, joined together that day in a civil union.

THE DOMESTIC

PARTNERSHIP

MOVEMENT

As early as the 1970s, some gay people began searching for mechanisms
other than marriage to secure legal recognition of their relationships. Some gay
men, for example, went to court and adopted their partners, since adoption
seemed to be the only available mechanism other than marriage by which one
person could form a legally recognized familial relationship with another person to whom he is not biologically related. Even though such adoptions have
often been approved by family courts over the years (perhaps because they
have been uncontested), 35 few gay men and even fewer lesbians have adopted
their partners. The symbolism is unappealing to most people-parent and
child, not a relationship of partners. In addition, the adoption of one adult by
another, even if it is recognized as valid by the state and federal government,
secures for the couple only some of the legal benefits that marriage offers.
Much more appealing have been various forms of recognizing the couple
relationship through devices commonly referred to as domestic partnership.
Broadly speaking, domestic partnership efforts take either or both of two
forms. The first form involves a public registration system for same-sex and
sometimes unmarried opposite-sex couples. At its purest, the registration carries no benefits. Instead, it simply provides public recognition of the worthiness of the same-sex or unmarried-couple relationships. In 1982, in the first
attempt at such a scheme, the Board of Supervisors of San Francisco voted to
permit unmarried couples to register if they affirmed that they were each
other's "principal domestic partner" and that they shared "the common necessities of life." The mayor of San Francisco at the time, Dianne Feinstein, vetoed the bill, expressing fears about the impact of domestic partnership on the
institution of marriage, but the bill nonetheless provided a model for ordinances that San Francisco itself and many other American cities have since
adopted. West Hollywood, California, was the first, in 1983.
The second form of domestic partner recognition focuses on a particular
benefit available to married persons or couples and seeks to secure the same
benefits for same-sex couples. In 1982, the Village Voice in New York City became the first employer to provide health and other benefits to the unmarried
partners of its employees on the same terms that they provided them to
spouses. In 1985, the cities of Berkeley and West Hollywood became the first
public employers to offer such partner benefits.
Piecemeal efforts to secure legal benefits for domestic partners have also
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taken other forms. In a celebrated case, the New York Court of Appeals held
that a regulation that permitted members of a tenant's "family" to remain in a
rent-controlled apartment after the death of the tenant should be interpreted
to include a tenant's long-term same-sex partner. 36 Similarly, in several states,
lesbians have been permitted to become the legal coparent of their partner's biological child, despite statutory language that seems to limit such adoptions to
persons legally married to the biological parent. 37 From one view, Vermont's
civil union bill is simply an example of domestic partnership legislation that
has been fully loaded with all the consequences of marriage.
The varied efforts for recognizing domestic partnership do not reflect a
unified ideology. Linking all the efforts is the common goal of securing recognition of the legitimacy and social worthiness of gay relationships. But some
proponents have seen the effort to obtain domestic partner benefits or registration as simply a first step toward obtaining legal marriage. For them, marriage remains the one great prize, with domestic partnership viewed as the best
that is attainable at the moment. For others, however, domestic partnership
has been an end in itself, an effort to secure recognition of an alternative form
of union for both opposite- and same-sex couples, or more broadly, one part of
an effort to secure the recognition of a wide variety of nontraditional family
forms. Tom Coleman of Los Angeles has probably been the most outspoken
single advocate in this latter movement. Coleman has also been a supporter of
gay marriage, so long as it is combined with the recognition of other relationships. Still others, such as Nancy Polikoff, favor domestic partnership and a
broad recognition of other nontraditional family relationships as alternatives to
marriage and disagree with Coleman. They distrust marriage and favor significantly reducing the special status attached to marriage in our society. Instead,
they wish the state to recognize the relationships that citizens view as significant to themselves, relationships that might include more than two intimately
involved persons and relationships that have no sexual component.
Because of the different goals and the different attitudes toward marriage, the relationships among those working on domestic partnership issues
have often been uneasy and distrustful. Most would be pleased if states recognized both marriage and domestic partnership. Those, such as Evan Wolfson,
who place a high premium on attaining the right to legal marriage fear that governments will eventually accept domestic partnership and stop there, abandoning gay people forever to a second-class form of citizenship. Those, such as
Paula Ettelbrick and Nancy Polikoff, who distrust marriage and seek the recognition of other forms of relationships fear that the marriage movement will succeed and that, if it does, legislators and courts will refuse to continue to expand
alternative ways of recognizing familial relationships. Each side finds dangers
in the other's priorities.
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Thus, even within single campaigns the two groups can end up in tension.
For example, a common issue in employers' decisions about offering partner
benefits is whether to limit the benefits to employees with a same-sex partner or
to extend the benefit as well to unmarried employees with an opposite-sex partner. For the employer, the issue is often solely one of costs, but proponents are
sometimes divided by ideology. Those whose primary allegiance is to securing
marriage for same-sex couples are willing to have domestic partnership benefits
limited to same-sex couples, content with the reasoning that only gay people deserve the benefits because only they are unable to marry. Those seeking a wider
definition of family want benefits for both unmarried same-sex and unmarried
opposite-sex couples (and for other nonmarital family bonds) as a way of affirming an alternative to marriage and advancing an expanded view of family.
Whatever the tensions among the goals of the advocates, the spread of
domestic partner registration and benefits has produced immediate and tangible benefits for tens of thousands of gay men and lesbians over the past
decade. In the late 1980s and 1990s, at least one municipality or county in
over half the states adopted some form of domestic partner registration, and
some provided benefits to their employees' partners. Registration and benefits
for public employees have been adopted in academic communities such as
Ithaca, Cambridge, and Ann Arbor, and large cities including New York,
Chicago, Los Angeles, and Seattle. Benefits have also been provided by large
counties such as Alameda County, California, and Wayne County, Michigan.
San Francisco, which initially rejected registration, adopted both registration
and partner benefits in the early 1990s and has now gone further than any
other city by requiring that employers who contract with the city also provide
partner benefits to their employees. 38
As we've seen above, Hawaii, in 1997, became the first state to adopt
partner registration, calling the couple not domestic partners but the even more
bloodless name reciprocal beneficiaries and permitting persons in a wide range
of relationships to register. Hawaii's extension of some of the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples is a more significant step than it might at first appear,
since most legal benefits and responsibilities of marriage are fixed by state law,
not by city or county ordinances. As of mid-1999, four states provide some
form of partner benefits. 39
California's legislature adopted somewhat similar legislation in 1996, but
it was vetoed by the governor, Pete Wilson. The efforts for the California legislation offered an opportunity for gay people to work together with others with
analogous goals. The California legislation was the result of joint efforts by gay
groups and groups representing senior citizens. The seniors groups were interested in protecting older people with a close tie to someone to whom they were
not married. By contrast, in the efforts for same-sex marriage, no other groups
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excluded today from legally marrying offer a potential ally for gay people. No
lobby exists for adolescents who want to marry, for siblings who want to marry,
or for polygamists.
The actions of cities and counties in providing benefits to employees
spread to public and private universities and private businesses in the midl 990s. The universities that adopted partner benefits included many of the
elite private universities and colleges in the country, as well as large public institutions such as the Universities of California, Washington, Iowa, Minnesota, Michigan, and New Mexico. The movement among large commercial
employers has been equally swift and extensive. A 1997 survey reported that
about a quarter of American companies with over five thousand employees offer partner benefits. 40 Among corporations and to a lesser extent among universities, the decisions of administrators to provide benefits seem largely to
have been driven by traditional market forces-by the desire to attract and
hold on to the most able employees and, to a lesser extent, to appear progressive to their customers. Thus, partner benefits are particularly widespread in
the media, entertainment, technology, and computers industries where large
numbers of out gay employees work within a relatively liberal political environment. Partner benefits have, however, also been adopted by several of the
largest oil companies in the United States, showing the power of market forces
in an industry not noted for its progressive views.
Some companies that have provided benefits have had to respond to market forces of a different sort. In 1996, the Southern Baptist Convention urged
its 16 million members to boycott the theme parks, movies, and television productions of the Walt Disney Corporation. The Convention had threatened a
boycott previously, but voted to implement one only after Disney adopted benefits for same-sex partners. 41 The boycott seems to have had little impact on
Disney's revenues, and boycotts of other companies become less and less plausible as partner benefits become common in mainstream corporations.
The success of efforts to obtain domestic partner benefits is, nonetheless,
a little less grand than it appears. As an initial matter, federal tax laws require unmarried employees to report as taxable income the value of health coverage provided to their partners but permit married employees to exclude it. Secondly,
even at corporations that have adopted benefits, most report that few employees
register. The reason appears to be in part that even when working for progressive
companies, many gay employees are still afraid to be known as gay.

HISTORY LESSONS

What can be learned from the movement to secure legal recognition of
gay relationships?
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In some ways, everything turns on the ultimate outcome. If other states
follow Vermont's lead and if, over time, Vermont and some other states permit
marriage itself, many will look back and think that all the losing cases and
DOMA and the repellent state legislation were worth enduring. They will
indeed regard them as skirmishes that had to be lost in building support
for a campaign that would inevitably be won. On the other hand, if Vermont
stands alone, or worse, if Vermont eventually adopts a regressive constitutional
amendment repealing the civil union legislation, those who have cautioned
against filing litigation will seem vindicated.
Still, whatever the outcome, a few lessons can be drawn now.
First, the marriage movement has also revealed just how difficult it is to
maintain a national strategy on an issue of local policy. Over and over again, a
couple somewhere has decided to seek a marriage license and turned to a na
tional gay or civil liberties organization for representation. The national organi
zation, on reasonable grounds, has advised against filing and declined to help.
The couple goes ahead-and even though they lose the case just as the na
tional group warned, they and their local allies grumble for years afterward
about the arrogant national group that refused to help. It is hard to know what
advice to draw from this experience for future marriage cases. After all, on
some occasions, local couples or groups have accepted the advice not to file,
thereby almost certainly avoiding a harmful appellate decision. The national
groups could try a middle course-beseeching couples in inauspicious states
not to file but telling them from the outset that if they reject the advice and do
seek a license, the national group will represent them. The paradoxical effect
of this course would probably be that some couples who would have decided
not to file if the national group had declined to help will choose to file because
the help is (reluctantly) promised. The short of it is that-much as with a par
ent whose child decides to marry someone whom the parent strongly dis
likes-any course the national group takes is likely to feel unsatisfactory.
Second, the marriage efforts, like the efforts to end the military ban, have
revealed just how vigorously conservative Americans will resist the efforts of
gay people to join the institutions that they hold most dear. We have stepped
on· the sacred turf of the American right-at home and at war. By the same to
ken, the persistent efforts of gay men and lesbians to enter these essentially
conservative institutions demonstrate the depth of our yearning for social ac
ceptance. The marriage efforts are especially touching in this respect. Tens of
thousands of gay people have joined together in ceremonies of their own de
vising, but most still crave to marry with the blessing of the state-less, it
seems, for the legal benefits that might flow from it than for the symbolism of
formal equality. The tenacity of the conservatives' resistance is the measure of
our need.
The final lesson is about the power of the word. For some years, Gover-
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nor Howard Dean of Vermont has been giving talks to public schools around
his state urging tolerance and acceptance of gay people. Yet, on the day after
the Vermont Supreme Court's decision, he stated publicly that "like anyone
else," he was troubled by the idea of "gay marriage." He would support domestic partnership (and he did, with vigor) but not marriage. His statement was
not unusual but is more than a little odd. Why is it that some persons who are
completely comfortable with extending to gay couples all the legal rights and
benefits of marriage are "troubled" about calling it marriage? All of the substance but not the ultimate affirmation. The starting point for an answer is to
recognize that "marriage" is an enchanted term that each society reserves for its
most highly valued sexual relationship. All the legal rights and benefits of marriage, taken together, are, in honesty, a fairly pallid package. What counts most
is the name. Still, even if we recognize that that is so, why is it that some liberals and many moderates who accept our entitlement to legal equality remain
reluctant to share with us the magical title? In what way do they find gay people's relationships, though tolerable, not fully equal to their own? I myself suspect that it has something to do with the ways that we gay folks have sex or
with the challenge we pose to traditional gender roles, but who knows? In any
event, the last hurdle toward full recognition will fall only when many more
straight people push beyond toleration, beyond acceptance. They will have to
come to see us as themselves. I'm not sure that we should want such an embrace, but that is what it will take.
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